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TAX BENEFITS IN MITIGATION OF RULE 10b-5
DAMAGES: WILLIAM Z. SALCER v. ENVICON
EQUITIES CORP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securities investors who claim to have been induced by fraud or de-
ceptive disclosure in the course of investing may file private litigation
actions under rule lOb-5 1 pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.2 The damages awardable in such actions, however,
are limited to "actual damages."3 The application of the "actual dam-
ages" limitation to securities that have been packaged and sold in the
form of tax shelters has provided defendants in rule lOb-5 actions with
the following unique affimative defense:
[D]efendants in private damage actions stemming from tax shelter in-
vestments may seek to establish that irrespective of any alleged mis-
statements, omissions or fraudulent conduct, plaintiffs suffered little or
no "actual" damages because of the tangible economic benefit they de-
rived from their investments in the form of large tax deductions which
may be used to offset their sizable outside incomes.4
In response to this "tangible economic benefit" defense, and in a
case of first impression, the Second Circuit Court in William Z. Salcer v.
Envicon Equities Corp.' (Salcer) held that tax benefits received from tax
shelter investments should be considered when determining the amount
of damages based on a violation of rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985). Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
Id.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
3. Id. § 78bb(a); see also infra notes 69-108 and accompanying text.
4. Russo, Rule l0b-5 Litigation and Tax Shelter Investments, 10 SEc. REG. L.J. 339, 340
(1983). This article also discusses the effect of the consideration of tax benefits on the discovery
stage of the litigation process.
5. 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 105 S, Ct. 2318 (1985).
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Act of 1934.6 This Note will examine the ramifications of the Salcer
decision in light of the unique interrelationship of tax benefits generated
by tax shelter investments and the damages award issue.
II. TAX SHELTERS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) role regarding
tax shelters arises primarily from the sections of the securities laws re-
lated to registration and antifraud.7 First, however, tax shelter invest-
ment interests must be treated as securities; then, they are subject to SEC
regulation.8 This is accomplished by classifying tax shelter investments
as "investment contracts."9 Although the term "investment contract" is
not defined in the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the Supreme Court in SEC v. .. Howey Co."0 held that an
investment contract exists where there is (1) a contract, transaction, or
scheme; (2) in which a person invests money; (3) in a common enterprise;
(4) with the expectation that she or he would earn a profit solely from the
efforts of others.'1  The fourth element of the Howey test is satisfied as
long as there exists some expectation of profit, even though the main or
sole reason why an investor invests in the venture is the expectation of
substantial tax benefits. 12
6. See id. at 941. In fact, the court went on to state that tax benefits "resulting directly from a
transaction under attack must be credited toward the damage award." Id at 942.
As used in this Note, the term "tax benefits" refers to the tax savings generated by tax deduc-
tions associated with an investment. For example, a tax deduction of $100 by an investor in the 50%
tax bracket yields a tax benefit of $50.
7. Under section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, it is unlawful to sell a security by means of
interstate commerce or the mails until a registration statement is in effect or has been filed, unless the
registration is exempt. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1982). Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
prohibits acts or practices which would operate as a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security. See id. § 78j(b). Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 deals with similar acts or
practices which would operate as a fraud in the offer and sale of any security. See id. § 77q(a).
S. See id. § 781(q).
9. Both the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982), and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1982), include "investment contract" in their definitions of
"security."
10. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
11. Id. at 298-99.
12. See, eg., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 407 (7th Cir. 1978) (real estate limited part-
nership), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 524 F. Supp. 866, 879
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (sales agency agreement), aff'd, 687 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1086 (1982); SEC v. International Mining Exch., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1981)
(gold investment scheme); Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Inv. Servs., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1209, 1221 (S.D.
Fla. 1980) (limited partnership interests), aft'd, 641 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1981); Sharp v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 457 F. Supp. 879, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (limited partnership interests), affd in relevantpart,
649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
An investment which takes the form of a general partnership or joint venture is not insulated
from the securities laws; but, it usually fails the "solely from the efforts of others" test because the
2
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Tax shelter investments have continued to proliferate into the
1980's. 13 This proliferation has prompted issuance of congressional legis-
lation in an attempt to curtail the abusive tax implications of such invest-
ments. 14 In response to abusive tax shelters, the SEC has also attempted
to assert its injunctive authority promulgated under both the 1933 and
1934 Acts.15 SEC enforcement actions involving fraud in tax shelter in-
vestments have been filed as a result of alleged misrepresentations and
omissions concerning: (1) the tax consequences of the investment;' 6
(2) assets acquired by the tax shelter;17 (3) the use of proceeds generated
by the investment;18 (4) commingling of assets in the tax shelter; 19 and
investor generally retains substantial control over his or her investment per the investor's manage-
ment controls outlined in the partnership agreement. See, eg., Williamson v. Tucker, 632 F.2d 579
(5th Cir. 1980).
13. See Slaughter, The Empire Strikes Back- Injunctions ofAbusive Tax Shelters After TEFRA,
3 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1983), reprinted in M. CAPLIN & C.R. NAMORATO, THIRD ANNUAL TAX
SHELTER CONTROVERSIES, THE IRS, JUSTICE & SEC CRACK DOWN 359 (1984).
As of September 30, 1984, 331,395 tax returns (described as "tax shelter cases") were being
audited by the IRS, as compared with 182,731 in 1979. During 1984, an additional 114,323 tax
shelter returns were closed after examination, with recommended taxes and penalties of $2.2 billion
- these returns accounted for approximately one-half of all recommended taxes and penalties for
1984. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: TAX SHELTERS AND MINIMUM
TAX (Comm. Print 1985), reprinted in DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 154, at J-2 (Aug. 9, 1985).
Taxpayers invested approximately $8.25 billion in limited partnerships registered with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission in 1984, compared to $8.4 billion in 1983, and $5.5 billion in
1982. Real estate accounted for 69% of these limited partnerships in 1984, while oil and gas de-
dined to approximately 19%, as compared to 36% in 1983. Id. (citing ROBERT A. STANGER & CO.,
THE STANGER REVIEW: TAX SHELTER SALES (Dec. 1984)).
14. See generally Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96
Stat. 324 (1982); Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978); Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83
Stat. 487 (1969). Congress added §§ 6700 and 7408 to the Internal Revenue Code to reduce the
burden placed on the federal tax system by abusive tax shelters. I.R.C. § 6700 (1982) provides
penalties for organizing or selling abusive tax shelters. I.R.C. § 7408 (1982) authorizes the govern-
ment to enjoin any person engaged in such activity by bringing an action in federal district court.
15. The SEC has used this authority in a number of tax shelter cases. See, eg., SEC v. Cohen,
1979-1980 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,335 (D.D.C. 1980) (law firm consented to order requiring
it use care that future tax opinions contain full and fair disclosure of all facts pertaining to tax
benefits); SEC v. Cal-Am Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (final order of injunction en-
tered when tax attorney assisted in the fraudulent activity of other defendants by falsely assuring
investors that 1976 criteria for shelters had been satisfied in resort condominium and coal tax shel-
ters); SEC v. Geo Dynamics Oil & Gas, Inc., 1975-1976 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,565 (D.D.C.
1976), 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 1 96,428 (D.D.C. 1978) (tax counsel consented to order that
alleged tax opinions contained materially false and misleading information).
16. See, eg., SEC v. International Mining Exch., Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1062, 1070 (D. Colo. 1981);
SEC v. Geo Dynamics Oil & Gas, Inc., 1975-1976 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,565 (D.D.C.
1976), 1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,428 (D.D.C. 1978).
17. E.g., SEC v. Rogers, 1980 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,670 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
18. See, e.g., SEC v. American Free Enter. Inst., 580 F. Supp. 270, 271 (D. Ariz. 1984); SEC v.
Asset Management Corp., 456 F. Supp. 998 (S.D. Ind. 1978), motion for jury trial denied, 1979-1980
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,278 (S.D. Ind. 1979).
19. E.g., SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1980) (General partnership interests of
3
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(5) conversion of investor funds to promoters' and others' use.a°
Tax shelters may take many forms21 and may be defined in many
ways; however, they generally possess either one or both of the following
attributes: (1) Deductions in excess of income from the investment,
taken in order to reduce income from other sources in that year; (2) cred-
its in excess of the tax attributable to the income from the investment,
taken in order to offset taxes or income from other sources.22 These
"write-offs" are often viewed as "artificial losses" because they are usu-
ally noneconomic in nature but nevertheless are available as deductions
under existing law.23
These "artificial losses" can be created, for example, in a partnership
context. The Internal Revenue Code permits a partnership to serve as a
conduit to the partners for all its taxable income and losses;2* however,
each partner may take his or her share of the partnership's deductible
losses only to the extent of the adjusted basis of his or her partnership
interest.25  The unique advantage served by a limited real estate partner-
ship,26 as opposed to most of the other types of limited or general part-
one partnership were assigned to limited partners from various other partnerships without disclosure
to the original general partnership owners.).
20. E.g., SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 1976-1977 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 95,621,final orders,
1977-1978 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,098 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
21. Tax shelters are commonly structured as limited partnerships and involve real estate, mo-
tion pictures, oil, gas, coal, gold, silver, or other mineral rights or royalty leases. M. CAPLIN & C.R.
NAMORATO, supra note 13, at 138-43.
22. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1982). Eight
guiding principles are provided in the opinion for an attorney who advises clients regarding tax
shelter investments: (1) Establish the relationship, (2) make a factual inquiry, (3) relate the law to
the facts, (4) ascertain that nontax legal issues have been considered, (5) consider all material tax
issues, (6) provide an opinion as to outcome on material tax issues, (7) provide an opinion as to
realization of aggregate tax benefits, and (8) establish accuracy of offering materials. Id.
23. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: TAX SHELTERS AND MINI-
MUM TAX (Comm. Print 1985), reprinted in DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 154, at J-1 (Aug. 9, 1985).
Most tax shelters have the following elements: (1) Deferral of tax liability to future years, resulting,
in effect, in an interest-free loan from the federal government; (2) conversion of ordinary income to
tax-favored income, such as capital gains; and (3) means by which taxpayers may maximize the tax
benefit of deductions, through the concept of "leverage" (i.e., using borrowed funds to pay deducti-
ble expenditures). Id.
24. See I.R.C. § 701 (1982). Although a partnership's "taxable income" is computed under
I.R.C. § 703 (1982) at the partnership level, it is for the purpose of allocating the taxable amounts
among the members, as "[plersons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax
only in their separate or individual capacities." Id. § 701. Thus, partnership losses may be used to
offset other income of the individual.
25. See id. § 704(d).
26. A limited partnership allows passive investors to invest capital and share directly in the
profits and losses of the partnership without being personally liable for the debts and liabilities of the
partnership beyond their amount of investment. But, at least one person, the general partner, has
unlimited liability for the obligations of the partnership. See Stewart & Merritt, The Revised Uni-
form Limited Partnership Act: An Effort to Modernize Partnership Law, 53 OKLA. B.J. 1560 (1982).
4
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nerships, is that the limited partner's basis is not currently subject to the
IRS's "at-risk" rules.27 The limited partner's basis therefore may be in-
creased by his or her proportional share of any nonrecourse loans28 made
to the partnership.29 Thus, the partnership is able to "artificially" gener-
ate large amounts of deductible losses and expenses in the early years of
the partnership which are passed on to the partners to use in offsetting
other income on their individual returns.30
The availability of these "artificial losses" plays an important role in
an investor's decision to invest in a partnership and explains the packag-
ig of such investments as "tax shelters."
III. PRIOR CASE LAW
The case law prior to Salcer was confusing and unsettled on the
issue of reducing damages awarded in rule lOb-5 violations by tax bene-
fits received from tax shelter investments by the injured party.3" One
27. See I.R.C. § 465 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). President Reagan's tax proposal would close this
"loophole" by extending the "at-risk" rules to encompass real estate investments. See TAX REFORM
BILL OF 1985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 3, 1985).
28. Nonrecourse loans are defined as loans for which the personal assets of the debtor are not
subject to attachment if the debtor should default on the loan. A. ROSENBERG, EVALUATING TAX
SHELTER OFFERINGS 149 (1978).
29. The objective of an "at-risk" rule is to limit the allowed loss to the amount that the investor
is economically "at-risk" with respect to that activity. R. TANNENHAUSER & C. TANNENHAUSER,
TAX SHELTERS: A COMPLETE GUIDE 65 (1978). An investor is consider "at-risk" with respect to
any money or property he or she contributed, any loans for which he or she is personally liable, and
any property he or she pledges to secure such loans. Id. Nonrecourse loans-loans for which the
investor is not personally liable-are not "at-risk" contributions, but the real estate limited partner-
ships are permitted to take advantage of the "leverage" provided by nonrecourse financing. See
I.R.C. § 465(c)(3)(D) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (basis of
property subject to a mortgage is undiminished by the mortgage's value).
30. See Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 173 n.6 (8th Cir. 1982), afjfd en banc, 768 F.2d
949 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov.
12, 1985) (No. 85-519). The court offered the following example:
A hypothetical real estate partnership might show a $50,000 loss in one year. Assume
that this loss was obtained by taking the difference between $60,000 of deductible deprecia-
tion and $10,000 of gross rents in excess of operating expenses and interest. If mortgage
amortization, a nondeductible expense, were $2,000, then the partnership would have a
positive cash flow of $8,000. If under the partnership agreement, one limited partner were
entitled to 50% of the partnership losses and 37.5% of the cash flow, that partner would
receive $3,000 in cash, but his tax return would reflect only his share of the partnership's
net loss, or $25,000.
Id. (quoting Note, Real Estate Limited Partnerships and Allocational Efficiency: The Incentive to Sue
for Securities Fraud, 63 VA. L. REV. 669, 673 n.22 (1977)).
31. Thejudicial dilemma is not isolated to securities fraud cases. The courts have continued to
struggle with this same issue with respect to personal injury damage awards. The Supreme Court
has ruled that juries must be instructed regarding the nontaxability of personal injury damage
awards filed under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA). See Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt,
444 U.S. 490 (1980). Many state courts, however, would still consider it reversible error to mention
in argument or jury instructions income tax treatment of damage awards. See, e.g., Klawonn v.
5
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month before the Second Circuit Court's Salcer decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court held in Western Federal Corp. v. Erickson32 that the damages
award should not be reduced by the amount of tax benefits received by
the plaintiffs from the investment.
33
The Western case involved plaintiffs who invested in a silver mining
venture.34 The plaintiffs were a corporation and a major shareholder of
that corporation, representing two of the sixty-six investors in the ven-
ture.35 The plaintiffs demanded rescission of the initial agreement and a
refund of their initial cash investment after discovering difficulties associ-
ated with the project.3 6 When the defendants refused to comply with the
plaintiffs' requests, 37 the plaintiffs filed suit under rule lOb-5. Judgment
was awarded for the plaintiffs, including an order for the defendants to
repay the initial cash investment and prejudgment interest and attorney's
fees. 38  On appeal, the defendants asserted the judgment should be re-
duced by tax benefits received by the plaintiffs. 39 The Ninth Circuit
Court quickly disposed of the issue in favor of the plaintiffs by relying
upon its recent decision in Burgess v. Premier Corp.4'
In Burgess, the plaintiffs had purchased tax shelter investments in
cattle herds, based on a representation by the defendant corporation that
its cattle were of superior quality.41 Each plaintiff claimed extensive tax
Mitchell, 105 Ill. 2d 450, -, 475 N.E.2d 857, 860 (1985); Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 547, 421
A.2d 674, 680 (1980). For an analysis of the tax issues presented in personal injury or wrongful
death actions, see Comment, Tax Issues of Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Awards, 19 TULSA
L.J. 702 (1984). In comparing these two areas of law, it is important to keep in mind that compensa-
tory damage awards for personal injury and wrongful death are excluded from gross income under
the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1982); Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47; Rev.
Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179, 180.
32. 739 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 1444.
34. Id. at 1441. Erickson, a geologist, and Davis, an accountant, were the promoters of the
venture. Erickson was to stake out and record mining claims in the Gila Canyon area of Nevada.
The claims would then be assigned to investors. Erickson was to develop the mines, and then turn
over the operation to defendant, Gila Mines Corporation, for which Davis was the president and
principal shareholder. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The investor, Guaclides, met with Erickson to discuss the investment. During the meet-
ing, Guaclides learned that Davis had been paid more than $400,000 for services. Guaclides de-
manded a return of his initial cash investment of $80,000. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Attorney's fees of $20,000 were awarded. The court also ordered the cancellation of the
promissory notes, development contracts, and mining contracts associated with the investment. Id.
39. Id. at 1444.
40. 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984).
41. Id. at 830. The plaintiffs purchased their investments pursuant to registration statements
and prospectuses filed with the SEC. Id. A prospectus explains the investment to potential inves-
tors, and its content must follow certain rules and regulations. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(b)(10), 77(j)
(1982).
6
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deductions but continued to lose money on the investment itself,42 which
was ultimately disposed of at a substantial loss. 43 The Ninth Circuit
Court awarded damages in the amount of the investors' out-of-pocket
losses but did not permit a reduction for tax benefits received." The
court reasoned that the plaintiffs would be required to include in income
the tax benefits previously received due to the tax benefit rule,45 obviating
the possibility of the plaintiffs reaping a double benefit.46
Several years prior to Western and Burgess, however, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held in Bridgen v.
Scott47 that ignoring the tax consequences of the investment would be
tantamount to trying the case before a "blindfolded" court and jury re-
siding in "an artificial 'never-never land.' ,,48 The district court also re-
jected the potential impact of the tax benefit rule by reasoning that even
if the plaintiffs were required to include tax benefits previously received
as income, the tax impact would not necessarily equate to the tax savings
previously afforded the plaintiffs.4 9 The Bridgen court also distinguished
other previous cases excluding tax benefits when awarding damages.5"
The Eighth Circuit Court, as reflected in its holding of Austin v.
42. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 830.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 838. The plaintiffs' pretax out-of-pocket losses were more than $339,000 greater than
their after tax losses, but the court refused to grant the plaintiffs prejudgment interest because they
enjoyed tax benefits which the jury did not consider when assessing the damages award. Id.
45. See infra notes 109-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the tax benefit rule and its
effect on damage awards.
46. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838. But, the court erroneously concluded that the plaintiffs would
have to file amended returns in order to effectuate the tax benefit rule. See infra note 110.
47. 456 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
48. Id. at 1061.
49. Id. at 1059. The court was alluding to a marginal rate tax analysis. This analysis calculates
the tax savings generated from a proposed investment to arrive at the net cost to the investor. For
example, if an investor who is in the 50% tax bracket pays $100 to purchase a unit in a tax shelter
partnership and receives a $50 tax savings from the investment, his net cost is only $50. The same
purchase by an investor in a lower tax bracket, such as 30%, would result in a tax savings of only
$30, with the net cost to the investor of $70. The same inconsistency would result if the investor
realized a tax savings of $50 at the time of the investment, but when required to include the same
$100 as income in a later year, his tax bracket had decreased to 30%, requiring the payment of $30
in tax. The result would be a net savings of $20 to the investor. This is the scenario suggested by the
Bridgen court. Even if the investor's tax bracket had not changed between the year of deduction and
the year of inclusion, he would still be paying the $50 back in "cheaper" dollars due to the "time
value of money" concept.
50. Id. at 1061-62; see, eg., Hanover Shoe Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968) (distinguished on the ground that the ease dealt with tortious deprivation of profits, not a case
of rescissory damages); G & R Corp. v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 1176 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (distinguished on the ground that the case did not involve a transaction in which a tax benefit
to be received was a principal motivation factor in the investment); Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co., 34
F.R.D. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (supports the view that tax considerations are relevant in a transaction
of a tax shelter nature); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (case
7
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Loftsgaarden,5' is also in opposition to the Ninth Circuit Court's hold-
ings in Western and Burgess. In Austin, the plaintiffs were investors in a
limited partnership organized for the purpose of building and operating a
Ramada Inn motel.52 The district court had found the defendants liable
for claims under rule lOb-5 and awarded the plaintiffs the amount of the
consideration that each had paid for the limited partnership unit or units
plus prejudgment interest and attorney's fees.53 The district court had
rejected the defendants' proffer of evidence that three of the four plain-
tiffs suffered no actual damages due to their tax savings from the
investment.5 4
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court held it was reversible error to
deny admission of such evidence because "the strictly compensatory na-
ture of damages awardable in private securities fraud actions requires
that such value be taken into account in determining whether and to
what extent damages were inflicted upon plaintiffs."55 The court limited
its ruling specifically to investments marketed and sold as tax shelters.56
Thus, prior to Salcer, the Ninth Circuit Court, the Eighth Circuit
Court, and the various district courts that had ruled on the issue of
whether the remedy available to a securities investor must be reduced by
any tax benefits received were split on the matter.
IV. THE SALCER DECISION
A. Summary of Facts
The facts in Salcer, as in Austin and Burgess, involved a limited part-
nership57 offering. In Salcer, the particular investment of the limited
partnership was the formation, construction, ownership, and operation of
a residential apartment complex located in Harris County, outside the
merely dealt with the issue of whether or not the defendant could compel the production of the
plaintiff's tax returns at a very preliminary stage of the proceedings).
51. 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982), affd en banc, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub
noma. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 85-519).
52. Id. at 172. A limited partnership was formed to help finance the $3.5 million project. One
million was to be raised by selling 40 limited partnership units to not more than 20 investors for
$25,000 per unit. The remainder of the money was to be obtained through mortgage and furniture
and fixture loans. Id. at 173.
53. Id. at 172. The district court had applied a rescissory remedy.
54. Id. at 181.
55. Id. at 183. The court extended the application of its holding to claims brought under Min-
nesota securities laws. See id. at 181.
56. Id. at 183.
57. For a brief explanation of a limited partnership, see supra note 26.
1986]
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Houston city limits." The plaintiffs had based their investment decision
in part on sales literature which included a "Private Placement Memo-
randum." 9 The memorandum contained a financial analysis projection
of the capital appreciation of the apartment complex and stated, "Only
persons whose income is subject to high rates of income taxation will
derive the full economic benefit of the intended tax benefits of this
offering."'
The plaintiffs suffered a net investment loss of $47,500 per unit as a
result of a forced sale.61 They alleged that the defendants knew or should
have known and failed to disclose that Houston, Texas was planning to
annex the premises on which the apartment complex was located, and
that the annexation could be expected to cause a substantial increase in
the costs of building and operating the complex.6" Since the financial
analysis included in the memorandum did not reflect these increased
costs, the plaintiffs sought the $47,500 per unit loss figure as rescissory
damages.63
The defendants' affirmative defense asserting that the plaintiffs had
realized tax benefits in excess of their claimed loss of $47,500 was struck
down by the district court.' 4 On appeal of this issue, the plaintiffs were
joined by the Department of Justice and the SEC as amicus curiae. 65
Even with this additional strength, however, the Second Circuit Court
reversed the granting of the motion to strike the defendants' affirmative
defense and remanded the case for further proceedings. 66
B. Analysis of the Salcer Decision
The Second Circuit Court's opinion was premised on two major
points of analysis: (1) The statutory interpretation of "actual damages"
as used in section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,67 and
(2) the inapplicability of the tax benefit rule to recovery of rescissory
damages.68
58. Salcer, 744 F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1984).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 938. The investors received $30,000 per unit, as proceeds from the forced sale. The
investors' basis in each unit was $77,500, thus a net loss of $47,500 resulted. Id. at 937-38.
62. Id. at 937.
63. Id at 938.
64. Id
65. Id at 941, 942.
66. Id. at 944.
67. Id. at 939-40.
68. Id at 943.
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1. Interpretation of "Actual Damages"
Damages which may be recovered for fraud in violation of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 are limited to "actual damages" pursuant
to section 28(c).6 9 The term "actual damages" is not defined in the 1934
Act itself; thus, it has been interpreted in various ways by the courts.7°
In fact, several earlier cases held that the "actual damages" limitation
was not applicable to rule lOb-5 actions since they stemmed from com-
mon law tort principles, rather than from the 1934 Act.71 This issue was
settled by the Supreme Court in a 1972 rule lOb-5 case, Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, when the Court made reference to section 28 in
its holding.7z
The Supreme Court has equated "actual damages" with "compensa-
tory damages" since its 1876 decision, Birdsall v. Coolidge,73 where it
stated, "Compensatory damages and actual damages mean the same
thing; that is, that the damages shall be the result of the injury alleged
and proved, and that the amount awarded shall be precisely commensu-
rate with the injury suffered . . . ."I The definition of compensatory
damages, however, is subjected to a further interpretational query-
should damages be based on an "out-of-pocket" rule, a "benefit-of-the-
bargain" rule, or some other appropriate standard.
7 1
The courts are split on this damages issue as well, 76 with the tradi-
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
70. A variety of measures of recovery may be sought by investors defrauded in securities trans-
actions. See 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 § 260.03(c) (rev. 2d
ed. 1985).
71. See, ag., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647, 649 (D. Colo. 1969), modi-
fied, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417,444-45 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 145 (D.
Md. 1968), modified, 412 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
72. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); see also Holmes v.
Bateson, 583 F.2d 542, 562 (1st Cir. 1978); Simon v. New Haven Bd. & Carton Co., 516 F.2d 303,
306 (2d Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 993 (1976); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43 (10th Cir. 1971); Thomas v. Duralite
Co., 386 F. Supp. 698, 723-24 (D.N.J. 1974), modified, 524 F.2d 577, 586-89 (3d Cir. 1975), affidper
curiam, 559 F.2d 1209 (3d Cir. 1977); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378
F. Supp. 112, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
73. 93 U.S. 64 (1876).
74. Id.
75. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 70; Annot., 29 A.L.R. FED. 646 (1976).
76. Confusion regarding rule lOb-5 remedies has been blamed on the courts' failure to recog-
nize that the rule derives from two sources at common law: (1) tort law, which focuses on the harm
to the plaintiff; and (2) unjust enrichment, which focuses on the defendant's gain. See Thompson,
The Measure of Recovery Under Rule l0b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 349, 352 (1984). In addition, the wide range of activities covered by rule lOb-5 attributes to the
variety of damages awarded. See A. JACOBS, supra note 70, § 260.03(a).
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tional measure of damages for a rule 10b-5 violation being the "out-of-
pocket" theory." The measure awards the difference between the
amount paid by the investor and the actual value the investor received.78
Consequential damages that resulted from the misrepresentation may
also be recovered.79 Some courts have allowed "benefit-of-the-bargain"
damages, which represent the difference between the value of the security
as represented by the defendant and the fair market value of the security
on the date of trade.8 0 The measure of damages issue is further compli-
cated in tax shelter investment cases because of the "dual motives" of the
investors who enter into the venture.
The "dual motives" involved in a tax shelter investment decision
are: (1) The tax benefits to be received, and (2) the anticipated capital
appreciation of the asset in which the plaintiff invested." The district
court in Salcer deemed the existence of these two motives so important
that it ruled the tax benefits received by the plaintiffs did not reduce the
damages award because "[t]hose tax benefits would have been realized
whether or not there was a fraud in this particular situation."8 2 The
district court reasoned that the allegations of fraud pertained only to the
capital appreciation aspect of the investment, not to the tax benefit as-
pect, because the investors had not made a claim of fraud for this aspect
of the investment and had received the tax benefits as outlined in the
"Private Placement Memorandum."8 3 The SEC espoused the same view
as the district court.8 4
But, on appeal, the Second Circuit Court rejected this rationale due
to its interpretation of and reliance on the "actual damages" limitation
contained in section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
states:
The rights and remedies provided by [the 1934 Act] shall be in
77. See A. JACOBS, supra note 70, § 260.03(a).
78. See, eg., Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 36 (3d Cir. 1979); Harris v. American Inv. Co.,
523 F.2d 220, 224-25 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Berkowitz v.
Baron, 428 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
79. See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238-39 (7th Cir. 1974) (damages incurred by
plaintiff while trying to avoid insolvency were allowed).
80. E-g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981); Redstone v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
583 F. Supp. 74, 76 (D. Mass. 1984); see A. JACOBS, supra note 70, § 260.03(c)(iii).
81. See Salcer, 744 F.2d at 938.
82. Id. (quoting unreported district court opinion of Salcer, southern district of New York
(Broderick, J.)).
83. Id at 937-38. The investors had received $67,866 in tax savings from their initial invest-
ment of $77,500, in addition to the $30,000 received upon sale of the investment. Thus, they were
$20,366 better off prior to filing their rule 10b-5 action. Id. at 942.
84. Id. at 940 n.5, 941 (SEC joined as amicus curiae on appeal).
[Vol. 21:542
11
Orand: Tax Benefits in Mitigation of Rule 10b-5 Damages: William Z. Salc
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
1986] RULE 10b-5 DAMAGES
addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law
or in equity; but no person permitted to maintain a suit for damages
under the provisions of [the 1934 Act] shall recover, through satisfac-
tion of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of his
actual damages on account of the act complained of.85
In Salcer, although the Second Circuit Court recognized that the
"actual damages" limitation does not necessarily rule out "benefit-of-the-
bargain" damages, it equated actual damages to a "net economic loss"
concept.8 6 The court saw no reason to exclude such factors in a compu-
tation for damages since tax benefits received are integral factors in any
"net economic" analysis.87 The circuit court stated, "It is not within our
power to ignore benefits bargained for and received by plaintiffs as a re-
sult of the transaction at issue, which represent real economic value miti-
gating any loss they may have suffered." ' s8
The Eighth Circuit Court employed a similar rationale in Austin
when it required actual damages be "reduced by any value received as a
result of the fraudulent transaction."89 Even the Ninth Circuit Court in
Burgess, although holding that damages should not be reduced by tax
benefits received, has recognized the relevancy of tax consequences for
certain purposes in the damages issue.90 The SEC has also recognized
the integral role which tax benefits play in real estate limited partnership
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982). Section 28(a) appears to rule out the possibility of recovering
punitive damages. Also, recovery under both rule lOb-5 and another federal or state remedy is
prohibited. The Supreme Court, however, has acknowledged that windfall damages may exist and
have allowed plaintiffs to recover the benefit reaped by the defendant, even if it exceeded the plain-
tiff's actual loss. See, eg., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1978); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (lst Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
86. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 940. Other courts have utilized the same theory. See, eg., Herpich v.
Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 810 (5th Cir. 1970) (limiting damages to "economic injury"); Verrecchia v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 563 F. Supp. 360, 367 (D.P.R. 1982) (limiting damages to eco-
nomic losses); Greitzer v. United States Nat'l Bank, 326 F. Supp. 762, 764 (S.D. Cal. 1971) (design
of 1934 Act was to afford "purely economic protection").
Damages for noneconomic injuries, such as emotional distress, are not recoverable. See, eg.,
Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275, 281 (2d Cir. 1975) (denied recovery for
corporation's loss in image or prestige which was not accompanied by monetary loss); Weiss v.
Hayden Stone, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 1074, 1075 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (denied damages for pain and suffer-
ing, mental and emotional distress, and wrongful death which had allegedly resulted from violation
of several federal securities acts); Greitzer, 326 F. Supp. at 763-64, 766 (emotional distress damages
denied).
87. See Salcer, 744 F.2d at 940-41.
88. Id. at 940.
89. Austin, 675 F.2d at 181 (citing Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978)).
90. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838. The court distinguished the relevancy of recognizing tax benefits
in personal injury judgments versus tax shelter fraud judgments- compensatory damages awarded
for personal injury are excluded from gross income. Id. (citing In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi-
cago, Ill., 701 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kahl v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 464
U.S. 866 (1983)); see also supra note 31.
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tax shelters; this recognition is shown by its requirement that the offeror
disclose prospective tax benefits that might be realized from the
investment.9'
The consideration of tax benefits in damage awards, however, can be
a "two-edged sword." Tax benefits could actually increase, rather than
decrease, damages. In Salcer, the court pointed out that the investors
had received the tax benefits bargained for;92 but, what if tax benefits
bargained for are not received? 93
The treatment of tax benefits bargained for but subsequently disal-
lowed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was the issue in the recent
securities fraud case before the Second Circuit Court, Freschi v. Grand
Coal Venture.94 In Freschi, the plaintiff invested $266,500 of trust funds
in the Grand Coal Venture largely for tax shelter purposes.95 During the
term of the investment, the plaintiff realized substantial tax benefits from
the investment.96
These benefits were subsequently disallowed by the IRS, resulting in
repayment of $659,846.67, plus a $264,500 interest penalty, by the plain-
tiff to the IRS.97 The IRS did allow the plaintiff to deduct the investment
cost of $266,500 as an investment loss which provided the plaintiff with
state and federal tax benefits of $188,682.98 The jury at the district court
level awarded the plaintiff $926,346 in damages, which appears to have
91. See Salcer, 744 F.2d at 942.
92. Id. at 940.
93. Deductions stemming from tax shelter investments may be disallowed by the Internal Reve-
nue Service on the grounds that the taxpayers entered into the shelter anticipating losses, not profits.
Deductions for activities "not engaged in for profit" are disallowed under I.R.C. § 183 (1982). See,
eg., Brannen v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471 (1982) (losses for a venture that syndicated a film for
$1.7 million were disallowed when that film had been sold for only $50,000 during the prior year),
afl'd, 722 F.2d 695 (1lth Cir. 1984); Hager v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 759 (1981) (losses for a ven-
ture were disallowed where investors paid approximately $15,000 per head for exotic breeding cattle
but only approximately $2,000-$3,000 per head had been paid by the direct importers).
Deductions have also been disallowed when shelters have been discovered to be complete
shams. See, eg., Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 210 (1983) (coal mining venture claimed deduc-
tions for advance royalties on all coal deemed to be recoverable when no coal ever was mined).
94. 767 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1985)
(No. 85-377).
95. Id. at 1044. William Freschi, Sr., the father of the plaintiff, was seeking a tax shelter for
$2,700,000 he had realized from the sale of his interest in a business. He initially established a trust
with his son as trustee. Id. at 1043.
96. Id. at 1045. Tax deductions claimed for 1977 and 1978 were $520,000. These deductions
reduced taxes by $337,034 and $322,813, respectively, on the senior Freschi's tax return. Because
Freschi's father was the sole beneficiary of the trust, all taxes were assessed directly against the
senior Freschi, but were paid by the trust. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The senior Freschi was allowed to offset the investment loss against his other income for
that year, resulting in substantial tax savings. See id.
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represented the additional tax assessed by the IRS plus the cost of the
original investment.99 But, the trial judge disallowed that part of the
award based on increased tax liability and offered the plaintiff remittitur
to $266,500, the amount of his original investment without reduction for
tax benefits."°° The plaintiff cross-appealed, claiming damages as a result
of the adverse tax consequences which he would have avoided if the in-
vestment had been a legitimate tax shelter. 10 1
The Second Circuit Court, taking into consideration the tax benefits
associated with the deduction of the investment loss, calculated the plain-
tiff's actual out-of-pocket loss to be only $77,818102 and denied the plain-
tiff's request for additional damages. 10 3 The court stated, "[A]ny award
in compensation for hoped-for tax savings would be an impermissible
award of damages arising from an expectation interest[,] ' 1 4 and con-
cluded by instructing that the plaintiff be offered a choice between dam-
ages of $77,818 plus prejudgment interest, or a new trial. 10 5 Thus, tax
benefits received may be used to reduce damages, but tax benefits bar-
gained for but not received may not always be recovered as damages.
In its process of interpreting the language in section 28(a) which
limits recovery to "actual damages," a court will generally focus on the
injury suffered by the plaintiff rather than the benefit reaped by the de-
fendant.106 This limited focus can be seen in the Salcer decision-the
defendant is permitted to benefit from that part of the investment which
was essentially "financed" by the government by means of the tax deduc-
tions the plaintiff was allowed to take. 0 7 It appears that the effect of the
99. See id. at 1045-46 (court did not specify what the damages represented; this is inferred from
the figures given - $659,846 and $266,500).
100. Id at 1046.
101. Id. at 1051. The plaintiff was asserting the "dual-motive" nature of a tax shelter invest-
ment. The senior Freschi had lost not only his investment, but also the anticipated capital apprecia-
tion and projected tax benefits associated with the investment. See supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
102. Freschi, 767 F.2d at 1051. The court subtracted the tax savings of $188,682 from the in-
vestment loss of $266,500 to arrive at the net loss figure of $77,818. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citations omitted).
105. Id The court awarded prejudgment interest only on $77,818, based on the assumption that
the IRS did not charge interest on the $266,500 loss deduction allowed to Freschi. Id. at 1051 &
n.12.
106. The relevant language of section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can be found
in the text accompanying supra note 85. Although courts generally focus solely upon the plaintiffs
injuries, the defendant's benefits may be taken into account under certain circumstances. See supra
note 85 (Supreme Court cases holding plaintiff entitled to such "windfall damages").
107. See Salcer, 744 F.2d 935 passim. The damages award, for which the defendant is liable, is
reduced by any economic benefits actually received by the plaintiff. For further explanation of how
the tax deductions permit the investor to benefit economically, see supra note 49.
1986]
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"actual damages" limitation is to leave the government "holding the
bag," or in the terms of the Burgess court, the government is made "the
banker for fraudulent tax shelter activity." '
2. The "Tax Benefit Rule"
The "tax benefit rule" provides that if an amount which was de-
ducted from gross income in a prior year is recovered in a later year, the
amount recovered is gross income in the later year.109 The Ninth Circuit
Court, in Burgess, chose not to reduce damages by tax benefits received
because, as the court stated, "[t]he [plaintiffs would] not receive a double
benefit from this measure of damages because under the tax benefit rule,
their prior tax benefits [would] be disallowed."' 10 Yet, in Salcer, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court rejected this argument when it was presented by the
Justice Department. The rationale of the Second Circuit Court was that
the form of damages sought in Salcer would negate the application of the
tax benefit rule. 1
In Salcer, the plaintiffs sought, and were permitted to obtain, rescis-
sory damages.112 The Second Circuit Court thus was able to distinguish
the case before it from Burgess-the plaintiffs in Burgess sought, and
were awarded, rescission.' 13 Unfortunately, the distinction fades when
analyzed vis-A-vis the tax benefit rule. Rescission-of a contract, for ex-
ample-is the "undoing of it from the beginning, and not merely a termi-
nation .... It necessarily involves a repudiation of the contract and a
refusal of the moving party to be further bound by it."114 But, rescission
108. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838.
109. See I.R.C. § 111 (1982). Although section 111 only specifically enumerates bad debts, prior
taxes, and delinquency amounts, it is applicable to "all other losses, expenditures, and accruals made
the basis of deductions from gross income for prior taxable years." Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1 (1981).
110. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838. The court in Burgess incorrectly concluded that the plaintiffs
would be required to file amended returns in order to effectuate the tax benefit rule. The correct
application of the rule is to require that the money judgment be reported as income in the year of
receipt. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
111. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 935.
112. Id. at 938.
113. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838.
114. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). The basis for permit-
ting rescission in rule lOb-5 actions is found in section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which states:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of [the 1934 Act] or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for listing a security on
an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made, the performance of which involves the violation
of, or the continuance of any relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of [the
1934 Act] or any rule or regulation thereunder, shall be void (1) as regards the rights of
any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have made or
engaged in the performance of any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any
[Vol. 21:542
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alone rarely compensates the injured party after the transaction has been
completed." 5 Therefore, a plaintiff's restitutional rights"l6 must be con-
sidered along with rescission. These restitutional rights are specific resti-
tution and rescissory damages.' i7
In Salcer, the plaintiffs sought rescissory damages in the form of
recoupment of the investment loss suffered due to the forced sale of the
apartment complex.1 8 In Burgess, the plaintiffs sought rescissory dam-
ages in the form of recoupment of their original investment, although
they too had suffered an investment loss on sale of their cattle.11 9 Yet,
the Second Circuit Court inferred that the damages sought by the plain-
tiffs in Salcer, if awarded, would not be subject to inclusion under the tax
benefit rule due to the "inconsistent/unexpected"'' 0 distinction applica-
ble to the tax benefit rule... as set forth by the Supreme Court in Hills-
boro National Bank v. Commissioner.'
In Hillsboro, the Supreme Court held that the tax benefit rule should
only apply when a "later event is indeed fundamentally inconsistent with
the premise on which the deduction was initially based." '123 The Court
person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder
with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance of such
contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation ....
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982).
115. See generally A. JACOBS, supra note 70, § 260.03(c)(vi) (rescission, restitution, and
equivalent damages).
116. Restitution is "the act of making good or giving equivalent for any loss, damage or injury
.... Restoration of status quo and [the] amount which would put plaintiff in as good a position as
he would have been [had the transaction never occurred] and [restoration] of what he parted with
[during performance]." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1180 (5th ed. 1979).
117. Rescissory damages are given to return the "injured party to the position he occupied
before he was induced by wrongful conduct to enter into the transaction. When return of the specific
property, right, etc. is not possible..., the rescissory damages would be the monetary equivalent
.... " BLACK'S LAWv DICTIONARY 679 (abr. 5th ed. 1983); see also A. JACOBS, supra note 70,
§ 260.03(c)(vi).
Some courts use the term "out-of-pocket damages" interchangeably with "rescissory damages"
because, "[w]hen the defendant returns that which he obtained by fraud he also puts the plaintiff
back in the position he was in before the fraudulent transaction." Thompson, supra note 76, at 375
(article highlights the inconsistent application of the term "rescissory damages" to rule l0b-5 cases).
118. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 938. See supra note 117 for a definition of rescissory damages.
119. Burgess, 727 F.2d at 830, 838. See supra note 117 for a definition of rescissory damages.
120. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
121. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 943.
122. 460 U.S. 370 (1983). In Hillsboro, the IRS had assessed a deficiency against a bank when
the bank recognized no income after it had taken a deduction in a prior year for taxes imposed on its
shareholders and paid by the bank. Id. at 374. The shareholders were subsequently granted a re-
fund of those taxes when Illinois declared the tax unconstitutional. Id. at 373. The Supreme Court
reversed the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit Court and held that the tax benefit rule did not
require a corporation to recognize income where it had paid disputed taxes for shareholders which
were subsequently refunded. Id. at 402.
123. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
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also attempted to distinguish an inconsistent event from a merely unex-
pected event, the latter not invoking the tax benefit rule. It held, "[Q]nly
if the occurrence of the event in the earlier year would have resulted in
the disallowance of the deduction can the Commissioner [of Internal
Revenue] require a compensatory recognition of income when the event
occurs in the later year."
124
The Supreme Court recognized the potential difficulty in applying
the "inconsistent/unexpected" test and stated:
[T]he tax benefit rule must be applied on a case-by-case basis. A court
must consider the facts and circumstances of each case in the light of
the purpose and function of the provisions granting the deductions....
When the later event takes place in the context of a nonrecogni-
tion provision of the [Internal Revenue] Code, there will be an inherent
tension between the tax benefit rule and the nonrecognition provi-
sion.... We cannot resolve that tension with a blanket rule that the
tax benefit rule will always prevail. Instead, we must focus on the par-
ticular provisions of the Code at issue in any case. 125
In Salcer and Burgess, each court presumably determined the appli-
cability of the tax benefit rule by considering all the facts and circum-
stances of the case before it vis-,-vis the reasons behind the relevant
income tax deduction provisions. In Burgess, the Ninth Circuit Court
recognized that the damages award granting rescission of the contract
would invoke the tax benefit rule.126 In Salcer, however, the Second Cir-
cuit Court failed to recognize that the damages award granting recoup-
ment of a previous investment loss could also require ordinary income
recognition.
In the Salcer opinion, the Second Circuit Court did not indicate
124. Id. at 389 (emphasis in original).
125. Id at 385-86 (citations omitted).
126. See Burgess, 727 F.2d at 838. Accordingly, the court refused to reduce the damages award
by the tax benefits. Id. In Austin v. Loftsgaarden, however, the Eight Circuit Court dealt with the
tax benefit rule in a different manner when it granted damages representing rescission of the con-
tract. The en banc decision of the court in Austin awarded the plaintiffs damages equal to their
original investment plus interest, but minus tax benefits. The court then doubled this amount be-
cause it "assume [d] that each plaintiff [was] still in the fifty percent tax bracket and thus [had to]
receive twice the above amount of damages and net interest cost." Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d
949, 960-61 (8th Cir. 1985), cert granted sub nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S.
Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 84-519). The effect of the "doubling" of the award was to compensate the
plaintiffs for the impact of the tax benefit rule. Yet, as the dissenting opinion pointed out, "Rather
than making up an artificial theory of damage by doubling the net gain, it is much simplier and more
accurate to provide the plaintiff with restitution of his investment." Id. at 963 (Lay & Bright, JJ.,
dissenting). The dissenting opinion also pointed out the potential "recapture" rules that may be
invoked by I.R.C. § 1245 (1982), which require ordinary income recapture for depreciation taken on
assets sold at a gain. See Rev. Rul. 80-58, 1980-1 C.B. 181 (IRS treated rescission as independent
transaction if it occurs in year subsequent to year of original investment).
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whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a deductible investment loss on
their individual tax returns at the time of the forced sale of their partner-
ship interests. If such an investment loss were allowed, recoupment of
that loss through a subsequent damages award would seem to invoke the
tax benefit rule. If, on the other hand, a taxable gain were to result from
the forced sale, the damages award would appear to represent additional
gain requiring income recognition.
127
3. The Government's Role as "Third Party Investor" and the
Effect of the Tax Benefit Rule
Although the role of the government in tax shelter investments was
not sufficiently significant to invoke the collateral source rule in Salcer,121
an accurate analysis of the tax shelter investment must take into consid-
eration the role of the government in such investments. The government
provides the tax benefits129 that minimize the investment costs of an in-
vestor without necessarily reducing the profit realized by a promoter.13 °
When damages are reduced by tax benefits received, an investor's recov-
ery is limited to "actual damages"; the profit realized by a promoter is
not reduced, however, and the government does not receive taxes on this
"profit" retained by the promoter.131
127. A taxable gain at the time of the forced sale would have resulted if the investors had re-
ceived more than their adjusted basis (original basis plus certain expenditures, minus certain deduc-
tions) in the partnership units sold. See I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1006 (1982).
128. Saicer, 744 F.2d at 941-42. The collateral source rule prevents the introduction of evidence
pertaining to benefits received by the plaintiff from sources independent of the transaction at issue.
The rationale is that defendants should not be permitted an offset against damages claimed by plain-
tiffs merely due to the fact that plaintiffs receive compensation from an independent source. See,
ag., Majestic v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 147 F.2d 621, 627 (6th Cir. 1945). In Salcer, the court
refused the application of the collateral source rule under the circumstances; it reasoned that tax
benefits (the "collateral source" for the Salcer plaintiffs) are not independent, as are, for example,
insurance policy benefits, which are obtained through independent negotiations by a policyholder.
Instead, tax benefits result directly from tax shelters and could not otherwise be realized without the
shelters.
This same "collateral source" argument has been advanced with respect to personal injury dam-
age awards and their resulting tax consequences. See, ag., W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark.
406, -, 643 S.W.2d 526, 532 (1982); Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Hawaii 42, -, 410 P.2d 976, 981
(1966); Michaud v. Steckino, 390 A.2d 524, 535 (Me. 1978).
129. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
130. Promoters have the use of funds which generate tax deductions, such as depreciation, but
do not affect cash flow. The dissenting opinion in Austin recognized that the defendant had received
a profit of at least $100,000 from the investment scheme and had gained both "his own profit from
the scheme and the advantage of plaintiffs' speculative tax benefits" that reduced the plaintiffs'
award. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949, 963 (8th Cir. 1985) (Lay & Bright, JJ., dissenting),
cert. granted sub nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 85-
519).
131. For example, if an investor invests $100 in a tax shelter and receives a tax benefit of $50, his
net cost is only $50. The promoter of the tax shelter, however, has received the benefit of the full
18
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When damages are not reduced by tax benefits received, a different
allocation among the parties results. An investor is not necessarily lim-
ited to "actual damages," but the government is "reimbursed" due to its
collection of taxes on this amount pursuant to the tax benefit rule. In
this scenario, a promoter, the "wrongdoer" in the transaction, does not
enjoy the benefit of being placed in a better position than the other par-
ties to the investment. 132
V. APPLYING THE SALCER DECISION TO FUTURE CASES
A. The Effect of Future Disallowance of Tax Benefits
In Salcer, the Second Circuit Court rejected the Justice Depart-
ment's argument that tax benefits should not reduce damage awards be-
cause they are "illusory" in nature. The court found that "the mere
possibility that the I.R.S. may later challenge the plaintiffs' tax benefits
[was] not sufficient for [it] .. .simply to ignore those benefits. There
must first be some showing of facts [in the case before the court] that
would justify such a challenge by the I.R.S." '33
The court implied that potential disallowance should be considered
if more than a "mere possibility" of challenge by the IRS existed. Con-
sidering the recent crackdown on tax shelter investments by the IRS,1 34
there is an increased possibility that such a challenge may be thrust on
tax shelter investors.
An inequitable result occurs if tax benefits are disallowed after the
investor has been awarded damages: undercompensation for the investor,
actual damages recovery for the government, and overcompensation for
the defendant promoter. 35 Once again, the "wrongdoer" promoter
would be left in a better position than the other parties to the transac-
tion. 136 Perhaps the only viable solution is for the investor to bring suit
after the "mere possibility" of disallowance is extinguished.137
$100. If the damages award is paid by the promoter net of the investor's tax benefit, the promoter
appears to be $50 better off.
132. If the damages award is not reduced by the investor's tax benefits, the promoter must pay
back the full $100 of the investor's money. Assuming the investor is in the same tax bracket as he or
she was in the year of investment and the tax benefit rule is applicable, the investor will pay taxes of
$50. The net result is that no party to the transaction is placed in a better position than he or she
held before entering into the transaction.
133. Salcer, 744 F.2d at 942.
134. See supra notes 13-14.
135. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
136. Id.
137. Generally, the IRS must assess a tax within three years after a tax return has been filed. See
I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1982). A special six year statute of limitations applies, however, if a taxpayer
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B. Effect on State Claims of a Similar Nature
Investors may opt to file a claim for damages under local state laws
or under rule 10b-5.13 8 At the state level, under common law, advanta-
geous factors to consider include the availability of punitive damages
139
and the possibility of greater compensatory damages. 14° Common law
damages, however, are more difficult to prove than a rule 10b-5
breach. 141 The Salcer decision has added an additional factor to be con-
sidered by potential litigants.
This additional factor was illustrated in a recent case before the
Third Circuit Court, Eisenberg v. Gagnon.42 In Eisenberg, the plaintiffs
were involved in a series of limited partnerships designed as tax shel-
ters. 143 The investments proved worthless and the IRS disallowed all
deductions other than the actual monetary loss associated with the in-
vestment itself.1  The jury awarded the plaintiffs the sum of their invest-
ment plus the interest paid to the IRS due to the disallowance of
deductions under a common law claim of negligence. 145
On appeal, the defendants argued that the jury should have reduced
the award by fifty percent because the ultimate loss on the investment
and the interest paid were deductible tax items.146 But, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had held in Gradel v. Inouye 47 that "[i]ncome tax as it
relates to damages should be mentioned neither in argument nor in jury
instructions."' 48 Thus, the Third Circuit Court rejected the defendant's
argument and held that the "jury's determination was consistent with
Pennsylvania law regarding the tax consequences of injuries from negli-
gence." 149 It did not decide whether the result would have been different
if the claim had arisen under federal securities laws.150
omits from gross income an amount properly includible which is in excess of 25% of the amount of
gross income stated in the return. Id. § 6501(e)(1)(A).
138. See A. JACOBS, supra note 70, § 260.03(a).
139. See id. § 260.03(e). But see Jacabson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 605 F.
Supp. 510, 512 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (1933 and 1934 Securities Acts do not permit recovery of punitive
damages).
140. See A. JACOBS, supra note 70, § 260.03(c). Some courts will not award "benefit-of-the-
bargain" damages in rule 10b-5 actions. See id. § 260.03(c)(v).
141. See id. § 260.03(a).
142. 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985).
143. Id. at 773.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 774, 782.
146. Id. at 782.
147. 491 Pa. 534, 421 A.2d 674 (1980).
148. Id. at 547, 421 A.2d at 680, quoted in Eisenberg, 766 F.2d at 782.
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A similar issue was before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in Felkay v. ZB Limited Partnership No.
P"151 The district court in Felkay did not address the defendant's argu-
ment that damages should be reduced by economic benefits such as tax
deductions since relief was granted to the plaintiff investors under con-
tract law.'5
2
The dilemma of state courts not applying the holding in Salcer be-
cause of the type of claim filed would parallel the trend in personal injury
and wrongful death actions established after the holding in Norfolk &
Western Railway v. Liepelt'153 that juries must be instructed regarding the
tax treatment of personal injury damage awards filed under the Federal
Employers Liability Act. 54
C. The Status of Oklahoma Law
In Feldman v. Pioneer Petroleum, Inc.,155 a recent case before the
United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the
district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim in part because tax benefits
received from the investment exceeded the plaintiffs' claimed lOSS.1 56
The tax shelter investment involved in Feldman was a working interest in
an oil and gas lease. 57 Approximately ninety percent of the capital con-
tributed by the investors was allocated to intangible drilling and develop-
ment costs1 58 entitling each investor to deduct ninety percent of his
investment for income tax purposes. 159 A second-tier partnership based
on nonrecourse loan"6 ' financing entitled each participating investor to
151. [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) 1 99,241, appeal denied, [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,581 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
152. Id.; see also Hayden v. McDonald, 742 F.2d 423, 440 (8th Cir. 1984) (court refused to
reduce damages by tax benefits received because claim was brought as a result of nonregistration of
securities under the Minnesota Blue Sky Act), overruled, Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949, 953
n.6 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. granted sub nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 54 U.S.L.W. 3328 (U.S. Nov.
12, 1985) (No. 85-519). But see Hall v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir. 1985) (application of
holdings offederal securities fraud cases to an action brought pursuant to Oregon's statutorily based
securities law; court refused to reduce damages by tax benefits generated by the investment).
153. 444 U.S. 490 (1980); see also supra note 31.
154. See supra note 31 for a discussion of jury instructions regarding the tax treatment of dam-
age awards.
155. 606 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
156. Id. at 923-24.
157. Id. at 918.
158. Id. Intangible drilling costs are those costs that have no salvage value and are incurred in
drilling, equipping, and operating the well. The costs may be deducted as incurred, rather than
depreciated over a period of time, thus providing substantial tax benefits. R. TANNENHAUSER & C.
TANNENHAUSER, supra note 29, at 145.
159. Feldman, 606 F. Supp. at 918.
160. For a definition of a nonrecourse loan, see supra note 28.
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an additional income tax deduction equal to ninety percent of his invest-
ment.1 61 Thus, an investment of $10,000 in the first-tier partnership ac-
companied by an election to participate in the second-tier partnership
would yield the investor tax deductions in the amount of $18,000.162
The district court recognized the IRS had audited the plaintiffs' tax
returns and had found that the tax shelter was a sham. 63 But, as of the
date of the court's decision, none of the plaintiffs had been required to
pay any additional taxes with respect to their 1972 federal income tax
returns.'64
The district court further recognized that if the IRS were to subse-
quently disallow the deductions associated with the investment, each
plaintiff would still be allowed a loss deduction in the amount of his orig-
inal investment-a tax benefit to the investor. But, the tax benefits re-
ceived from the loss deduction would be less than tax benefits received if
the original deductions associated with the investment had been al-
lowed.' 65 The court refused to allow this difference as damages, how-
ever, due to the purely "speculative" nature of the settlement.166
In summary, the court reasoned that plaintiff Feldman had actually
retained an $80,000 profit, based on his $200,000 investment which had
provided $250,000 in tax benefits and $30,000 in income.' 67 Based on
this fact, the court concluded "that the Plaintiffs [had] failed to prove
they [had] suffered actual loss even though the tax benefits promised in
the Prospectus may not materialize."'
68
VI. CONCLUSION
The Salcer decision effectuated the "actual damages" limitation,
which is provided in section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, but failed to consider the dual motives of the investor who is enter-
ing into a tax shelter investment. The decision also failed to give ade-
quate deference to the unique triangular nature of tax shelter
investments: it failed to recognize the importance of the role of the gov-
161. Feldman, 606 F. Supp. at 918.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 923.
164. Id. at 923-24. Tax disputes involving investors in the case at hand had been designated by
the IRS as "settlement vehicles," meaning the IRS is attempting to settle the disputes by offering to
allow 100% of each investment as a deduction to the investor. Id. at 924.
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eminent as the "third party investor" who provides the controversial tax
benefits in tax shelter investments.
The effect of the decision is to benefit the promoter through reduced
damage awards-unfortunately at the government's expense-with the
potential risk of minimizing the deterrent aspect of the securities laws.
The better solution is federal tax reform which would curtail the abusive
nature of tax shelter investments. Also, proper application of the tax
benefit rule would tax, as income, the damages award received by an
investor, thus more closely effectuating a compensatory damages award
for all parties involved.
Rebecca R. Orand
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